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Impacts of climate change

The mortality impacts of climate change - part 4 of a 5-part series

Climate Quantified|Insurance Consulting and Technology
Climate and Resilience Hub|Climate Risk and Resilience|Insurer Solutions

By Keziah Baskerville-Muscutt and Richard Marshall | April 27, 2021

This paper investigates the liability-side impact of climate change. The fourth chapter looks at the individual and combined effects of stresses to the climate variables.

Model results – individual climate variables

This chapter presents the impact of climate change on expectation of life for individual climate drivers and provides a short discussion of results in the context of current available research.

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About this series

'The mortality impacts of climate change' investigates the liability-side impact of climate change, focusing on the effects on UK life insurers. It considers the mechanisms through which climate can affect mortality, models and quantifies some of those effects and discusses the implications for the life insurance industry.

Figures 1 and 2 below show the proportional change in expectation of life relative to the base scenario for both the best- and worst-case scenarios, respectively. Key findings to highlight are:

  • In the worst-case scenario, the key driver affecting mortality is air pollution. Long-term exposure to polluted air has been shown to lead to permanent health effects such as accelerated aging of the lungs, loss of lung capacity and decreased lung function, and development of diseases such as asthma, bronchitis, emphysema, and possibly cancer; all of which can lead to death (Schwartz & Marcus, 1990; Samet, et al., 2000).
  • In the best-case scenario, the key driver affecting mortality is temperature. The temperature-mortality relationship has been variously described as having U, V or J shapes, with increased mortality at cold and hot temperatures (Hajat, et al., 2007).
  • The impact of climate change on expectation on life is greatest at younger ages. Not only do younger people have a longer expectation of life in general, they are also most likely to be exposed to the worst effects of climate change in the mid- to long-term.
  • Overall, the impact of any individual climate driver on expectation of life is very small (up to -0.11%) in the worst-case scenario, and negligible in the best-case scenario.
graph showing proportional change in expectation of life relative to the base scenario for the best-case scenario
Figure 1. Proportional change in expectation of life relative to the base scenario for the best-case scenario


graph showing proportional change in expectation of life relative to the base scenario for the worst-case scenario
Figure 2. Proportional change in expectation of life relative to the base scenario for the worst-case scenario

Model results – overall scenario stresses

In addition to looking at the impact of individual drivers on expectation of life, the impact of combined drivers was also considered. Results are presented in Figure 3 and agree that the impact of climate change will likely be greater for younger people than old. Overall, however, the impact remains relatively immaterial.

For context, under the best estimate scenario the remaining expectation of life for a 30-year old individual is 54.5 years; under the worst-case scenario, the remaining expectation of life for that same individual is approximately 20 days shorter.

graph showing proportional change in expectation of life relative to the base scenario for the best- and worst-case scenario for combined climate drivers
Figure 3. Proportional change in expectation of life relative to the base scenario for the best- and worst-case scenario for combined climate drivers

The table below shows the proportional change in deferred expectation of life relative to the base scenario for both the best- and worst-case scenarios from age 65. Results agree with the observation above that the impact of climate change will be felt more in the mid-to-long term.

Proportional change in deferred expectation of life relative to the base scenario for both the best- and worst-case scenarios from age 65.
Year Worst-case scenario Best-case scenario
2019 -0.34% 0.03%
2024 -0.48% 0.04%
2029 -0.65% 0.05%
2034 -0.82% 0.06%
2039 -1.01% 0.08%
2044 -1.21% 0.10%
2049 -1.41% 0.11%
2054 -1.59% 0.13%

Overall, the results presented above suggest that none of the climate drivers considered here are particularly material in isolation, and that even in combination the impacts are small. This should give comfort to life insurance companies that the liability side impacts of climate change risk will probably be very small.

Consideration of ‘excluded’ drivers

It is important to recognise that this is not the end of the story; the climate variables above formed only a subset of all of those drivers which could have been modelled, given a demonstrable link between those drivers and mortality. Those drivers excluded from the previously described modelling may nevertheless have a material impact on mortality through mechanisms which have not been investigated or sufficiently robustly researched and reported in academia at this time. Excluded drivers therefore represent a significant source of uncertainty and model risk.

This section explores the potential impacts of several excluded drivers:

  • Economic impacts of climate change
  • Potential for 'tropical' diseases to become endemic to the UK
  • Flooding
  • Risks to domestic and international food production and trade
  • Potential impacts of (global) coastal flooding and soil leeching on food security
  • Potential transitional impacts on mortality
  • Potential climate-related mass-migration or conflict

The exclusion of these drivers is not intended to imply that there would be negligible impact on mortality from these sources (though this may be the case for some), but rather to indicate that there was insufficient evidence of their likely effect on mortality to include them within a driver-based modelling approach. It would therefore be remiss not to consider the potential impacts of excluded drivers using a more qualitative approach.

Additional consideration of these drivers may be particularly necessary (and potentially material) when considering the very long-term impacts of climate change.

Economic impacts of climate change

Climate change will lead to economic costs as well as benefits. Temperature, precipitation, storms, and other aspects of the weather associated with climate change may affect economic performance (agricultural production, labour productivity, commodity prices and economic growth (Stern, 2007; IPCC, 2013; Hsiang, 2016). Emission reduction may help to avoid climate damage and adaptation costs in the long-term, but entails associated increased investment cost in the shorter term. Firms will face uncertain climate policy compliance costs and increasing costs for non-compliance.

If climate change affects economic growth, this may have a knock-on effect on public services: healthcare spending, social care spending, public health initiatives may all experience budget adjustments in light of changes in tax revenue and the cost of borrowing. Although there is little published academic research on the potential impact of economic performance on mortality, reduced funding for public services is likely (all other things equal) to adversely affect patient outcomes i.e. morbidity and mortality rates.

The following sub-sections explore the potential economic costs of transition to net-zero emissions, of compliance (and non-compliance) with climate policy and of longer-term economic impacts.

Cost of transition to net-zero

Transitioning to a lower carbon economy may entail extensive policy, legal, technology, and market changes to address mitigation and adaptation requirements related to climate change. The costs of this transition will depend depending on the nature, speed, and focus of these changes (FSB, 2017).

In the UK, a comprehensive assessment of the costs of the transition has been developed by the Climate Change Committee (CCC) and published in their recommendations for the UK’s Sixth Carbon Budget, which will run from 2033 to 2037 (Climate Change Committee, 2020). The CCC dedicate a chapter to outlining the costs of transition to net-zero emission by 2050 for one climate pathway. The key conclusions of this chapter are:

  • Low-carbon investment must scale up from around £10 billion in 2020 to around £50 billion by 2030 (continuing at around that level through to 2050) to deliver net zero. For comparison, total investment in the UK in 2019 was around £390 billion. The CCC argue that this increase can be achieved if effective policy is put in place.
  • Much of this investment can be recovered through lower operating costs. For example, substantial fuel savings could be generated through investment in cleaner, more efficient technologies to replace their fossil fuelled predecessors which, in time, cancel out the investment costs entirely. The CCC estimate that total savings, many of which relate to reduced reliance on imported fossil fuels, will be around £35 billion by 2035 and £60 billion by 2050.
  • Overall, the CCC found that the net costs of the transition (including upfront investment, ongoing running costs and costs of financing) will be less than 1% of GDP over the whole period 2020-2050. However, the transition will be capital-intensive, with increased upfront spending.
  • In the near-term, UK GDP may be boosted. As the economy rebuilds after the COVID-19 crisis, the CCC suggest that increased low-emission investment can stimulate activity and employment in the rest of the economy. Modelling commissioned for the CCC report indicates a potential boost to GDP of around 2% by 2035, or at worst, the economy would return to similar levels to those expected without climate action.
  • Industrial or innovation opportunities may bring additional economic benefits from. The CCC analysis is based on fairly conservative assumptions about the development of low-carbon technologies. In practice, technology costs could fall faster (e.g. as witnessed previously for offshore wind), implying greater economic benefit.

It is important to note that these estimates relate to just one climate pathway developed by the CCC. The actual economic costs and benefits of deep decarbonisation are unknowable with any precision as they depend on many uncertain outcomes. The actual impact could ‘be lower or even positive’ because of secondary benefits, including lower healthcare costs (due to improved air quality), lower extreme-weather risks and new industrial opportunities. On the other hand, technology progress could be much slower and costs correspondingly higher if the rest of the world were not to materially increase effort in order to meet the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.

Costs of compliance and non-compliance

Compliance costs encompass everything that is involved in keeping a business compliant with relevant regulations. In contrast, the cost of non-compliance can include fines, settlements in civil lawsuits, business disruption and loss of productivity and revenue (FMP Global, 2018).

Regarding compliance with climate policy, UK companies face uncertain costs given uncertainty about the type and nature of future public policy intervention. The cost of complying with climate policy may depend on whether foreign trading partners engage in similar domestic environmental regulations. For example, businesses that depend on carbon-intensive or energy -intensive practices and compete in international markets may face challenges if they have significant compliance costs from decarbonisation not faced by international competitors (Aldy & Viscusi, 2014). This issue has become prominent in the debate over climate change policy, although several studies suggest that estimated impacts used in political rhetoric overestimate the likely size of costs faced by companies covered by decarbonisation policies (Aldy & Pizer, 2009; Aldy, et al., 2010)

Companies that do not meet compliance requirements face significant financial and reputational impacts. Recently released information from the Environment Agency show civil penalties imposed for breaches of climate change-related regulations, including in respect of the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme (CRC), and the Energy Saving Opportunities Scheme (ESOS). The largest single fine imposed in 2020 (indeed, the largest fine ever imposed in the UK) was over £50 million to airline Flybe for failing to surrender sufficient allowances for EU ETS in the 2019 compliance year and there were a significant number of other fines amounting to tens of millions of pounds each ( Environment Agency, 2020). In addition to fines, there can also be a reputational impact, as the Environment Agency report names the non-compliant parties. Furthermore, if companies are required to implement compliance changes before being able to resume operations, they may be faced with business disruption which, in an extreme scenario, has the potential to paralyse an entire company.

High fines will continue to be on the agenda for UK companies breaching climate-change regulations post-Brexit. A UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS) replaced the UK’s participation in the EU ETS on 1 January 2021 (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2021). The UK ETS is largely a mirror image of the EU ETS to ensure a smooth transition but is slightly more ambitious with regard to the cap and floor price.

Longer-term economic impacts

In the long-term, a persistent rise in temperature, changes in precipitation patterns and/or more volatile weather events can have long-term macroeconomic effects by adversely affecting labour productivity, slowing investment and damaging human health (Kahn, et al., 2019). One of the most comprehensive studies of long-term effects has been carried out by Kompas, et al. (2018), who use a large dimensional intertemporal computable general equilibrium (CGE) trade model to account for the various effects of global warming (e.g., loss in agricultural productivity, sea level rise, and health effects) on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth for 139 countries, by decade and over the long term. They show considerable global economic gains from complying with the Paris Climate Accord for all of the 139 countries. For example, with the comparative case of a temperature increase of four degrees, the global gains from complying with the 2°C target are approximately US$17,489 billion per year in the long-term (year 2100). The relative damages from not complying are especially severe to Sub‐Sahara Africa, India, and Southeast Asia.

Kompas et al. (2018) estimate that the long‐term impacts of climate change on the UK’s GDP will be -0.260 % change per year under the RCP 4.5 scenario by 2100, compared to -0.122% and -0.613% under the RCP 2.6 and 8.5 scenarios, respectively. It is important to note that these figures will not capture the full potential impacts of climate change as outcomes such as loss of human lives, loss of culture or identity, or biodiversity loss are difficult to value in monetary terms, so are often omitted from projections.

The UK economy could also be affected by climate change impacts occurring overseas. Hunt, et al. (2009) summarise four main types of international climate change impacts that may have secondary effects on the UK, including:

  • Changes in trade conditions within a country, with associated implications for UK terms of trade with that country/region. For instance, the 2011 floods in Thailand affected computer supplies worldwide as the affected area was the centre of global hard drive manufacturing.
  • Internal or external conflicts, with security implications for the UK (see the report section titled ‘Potential climate-related mass migration or conflict’).
  • Movement of resources within a country, with associated pressures on e.g. UK migration policy (see the report section titled ‘Potential climate-related mass migration or conflict’).
  • Wider macro-economic effects associated with one, or a combination, of the above.

Potential for ‘tropical’ diseases to become endemic to the UK

A consequence of long-term alterations to the UK climate is changes to populations of native and invasive non-native species, including the prevalence of disease-transmitting species such as ticks or mosquitoes. The extent to which climate change affects vector-borne diseases is vector-, host- and disease-dependent. Furthermore, the effects of climate change are interlinked with globalisation, land use and socio-economic factors and distinguishing between these can prove challenging. This section discusses the potential for three specific vector-borne tropical diseases to become endemic to the UK, and the subsequent impact on cases and fatalities.

Malaria

Malaria is transmitted to humans by female mosquitoes of the genus Anopheles. Malaria in the UK is an imported disease but there is evidence that it was once indigenous. As climate changes in the UK, permanent invasive mosquito species populations may once again become established (Medlock & Leach, 2015; Baylis, 2017). As noted in Section 2, higher temperatures typically decrease the time it takes for mosquitoes to become infectious, potentially allowing more opportunities for transmission when feeding. The current UK climate is already suitable for Ae. albopictus, but further rises in temperature could increase the months and areas in which these mosquitoes can be active.

Currently, models suggest a 1⁰C average rise in mean temperature by 2030-2050 could lead to an approximate one to two week extension of adult mosquito activity in Southern England. Ae. aegypti and invasive malarial vectors could also become established if temperatures become warmer for extended periods of time. According to PHE and models from the Met Office, other UK climate variables, such as humidity and rainfall, will also change, leading to altered water availability influencing mosquito breeding levels (Baylis, 2017; Metelmann, et al., 2019). However, mosquito establishment does not always mean spread of the diseases they can carry, as other factors such as biting behaviour, affects their capacity to transmit disease.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has attempted to quantify the additional amount of human disease that might arise as a consequence of climate change. Inevitably, there is significant uncertainty, but in a recent assessment for the years 2030 and 2050, WHO found no projected deaths in Western Europe from P. falciparum malaria or dengue. Similarly, Lindsay, et al. (2010) concluded that although the future climate in the UK is favourable for the transmission of vivax malaria, the future risk of locally transmitted malaria is considered low because of low vector biting rates and the low probability of vectors feeding on a malaria-infected person. It should also be noted that the risk of malaria transmission is influenced by many factors other than climate (such as drainage of marshes and changes in land use) which make the probability of transmission very small.

As part of the process to short-list climate drivers we estimated the number of potential deaths in the UK from malaria. Case fatality rate outside of Africa is around 0.3% according to the WHO (WHO, 2015). We estimate that 3% of the UK population could be exposed to malaria (2% who live in rural wetland areas and 1% who are visitors), so there is the potential for approximately 40,000 cases. Assuming no improvement to the case fatality rate we could therefore expect around 120 deaths per year.

Tick-borne encephalitis

Transmission of tick-borne encephalitis virus is highly reliant on co-feeding of different tick stages, which is affected by weather and climate. Current climate models do not predict an expansion of the range to the UK (Medlock & Leach, 2015; Cull, et al., 2018). In fact, PHE predicts that changes to the UK climate are likely to have a smaller impact on ticks than land use changes, especially woodland areas (Medlock, et al., 2013; Medlock & Leach, 2015). This is because tick populations are concentrated in wooded areas and where there are high numbers of host populations such as deer or sheep (Medlock, et al., 2013).

As part of the process to short-list climate drivers we estimated the number of potential deaths in the UK from tick-borne encephalitis. Although there is a vaccine, cases in endemic regions have previously been reported at up to 10 per 100,000 population (using a case study of an area of Bavaria) and we estimate a case fatality rate of 10 to20%. The vaccine is 80%+ effective. Using this information, we estimate approximately 1,200 cases per year and (assuming no improvements to the case fatality rate) around 120-240 deaths per year from tick-borne encephalitis.

Dengue fever

Dengue fever is a mosquito-borne tropical disease caused by the dengue virus. Like malaria, it is possible that increased temperatures associated with climate change will decrease the time it takes for mosquitoes to become infectious, potentially allowing more opportunities for transmission. However, unlike malaria PHE has yet to undertake a full risk assessment (although one is being undertaken) and so the potential impacts are uncertain (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2019).

As part of the process to short-list climate drivers we estimated of the number of potential deaths in the UK from dengue fever. Taking Taiwan (c. one third of the UK population) as an extreme example, the country recorded 15,000+ cases and 20 deaths in 2014 and 43,000+ cases and 228 deaths in 2015. We would expect the incidence per head of population to be lower in the UK because there are fewer wetlands in the UK; we suggest around 30,000 cases per year. Assuming a similar case fatality rate to that seen in Taiwan, we could therefore expect around 40 to 120 deaths per year from dengue fever.

Other diseases considered

Other diseases considered include Lyme disease and Chikungunya. Lyme disease is a bacterial infection caused by the Borrelia bacteria that can be spread to humans by infected ticks of the species Ixodes Ricinus, amongst others. It is the most common vector-borne disease in the UK, with around 3,000 new cases reported annually in England and Wales. Chikungunya is an infection caused by the Chikungunya virus (CHIKV) which is spread to people by the bite of an infected mosquito. In recent years a small number of cases have been reported in England, Wales and Northern Ireland each year. Most have been acquired in the Indian sub-continent and South East Asia. There is no vaccine to prevent or medicine to treat chikungunya virus infection.

While there is consensus that climate affects the transmission of tick-borne Lyme disease, there are little to no published models projecting its future incidence in Europe under scenarios of climate change (Medlock & Leach, 2015). Models for other temperate regions suggest that climate change may increase the range of the tick vectors throughout the UK and, therefore, increasing disease incidence. However, like tick-borne encephalitis, non-climate drivers play a dominant role in the epidemiology of Lyme disease and future trends in agriculture, land use, wild animal populations and tourism will likely play a larger role in determining future patterns of the disease than climate drivers (Medlock & Leach, 2015).

There are several studies focussing on the risk of spread of Chikungunya in the UK resulting from climate change. A comprehensive article by Medlock & Leach (2015) suggests that a 1°C rise in temperature would permit Chikungunya virus transmission for one to three months of the year across most of southeast England by 2071-2100. However, as noted above, although the future climate in the UK may be favourable for the transmission of Chikungunya, the future risk of locally transmitted Chikungunya will likely be low because of low vector biting rates and the low probability of vectors feeding on a Chikungunya -infected person (Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology, 2019).

Climate variables with no established link to mortality

Flooding

Floods are mainly associated with accidental deaths (i.e. from drowning), but could also prevent access to health facilities, leading to indirect deaths from a variety of causes. Climate change in the UK is likely to be associated with an increased risk of severe flooding. However, the UK has a strong infrastructure and so the impact of flooding on mortality over the next ~60 years is likely to be small.

Risks to domestic and international food production and trade

Access to safe, nutritious and affordable food in the UK is subject to domestic and international risks. Climate change may present new opportunities to increase domestic production, but unless more action is taken the condition of soils and scarce water resources are likely to be limiting factors. Global population growth combined with sea level rise, losing low-lying arable land, and temperature change in current major food-production locations may increase risks surrounding domestic and international food production and trade. However, there are offsetting factors, e.g. hydroponics. For simplicity, risks to domestic and international food production and trade were excluded from this analysis.

Potential impacts of (global) coastal flooding and soil leeching on food security

Sea level rise is one of the most severe impacts of climate change but is also one of the impacts with the largest uncertainties, with different studies projecting widely different ranges over the 21st century. Agriculture is widely regarded as one of the sectors at most risk from a changing climate in the UK, in part due to the potential impact of sea level rise (Knox, et al., 2012). Increased flooding caused by sea-level rise may lead to substantial losses in crop production in low-lying agricultural areas and may contribute to compaction, waterlogging and erosion of soil. Wetter autumns and winters may threaten agricultural production by adversely affecting the timing of land-management operations (Morison & Matthews, 2016).

Potential transitional impacts on mortality

Transitioning to a lower carbon economy may entail extensive policy, legal, technology, and market changes to address mitigation and adaptation requirements related to climate change. Depending on the nature, speed, and focus of these changes, transition risks may pose varying levels of risk (FSB, 2017). Although there is very little published academic research on the potential impact of transitional risk on mortality, it is worth considering the following possibilities:

  • Public spending is diverted from healthcare towards efforts to mitigate and/or adapt to the impacts of climate change. As discussed previously, the reduced level of funding for healthcare services has a knock-on effect on patient outcomes i.e. morbidity and mortality rates.
  • Physical assets such as land or water supplies are re-allocated for use in green energy schemes (e.g. carbon capture storage).
  • Working habits, and therefore exercise and diet habits, change in a changing climate. This could have a direct impact on health and wellbeing.

Potential climate-related mass-migration or conflict

Climate change is among the newly visible issues driving mass movements of people and sparking conflict or exacerbating existing instability in some of the world’s most vulnerable regions. Climate refugees or climate migrants are a subset of environmental migrants who were forced to flee "due to sudden or gradual alterations in the natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate change: sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity." The United Nations University and the Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance estimates that the world could see 200 million to 1 billion climate migrants by 2050 (Schwerdtle, et al., 2018). The direct link between conflict and climate change is still unclear and so awareness of the indirect links has yet to lead to substantial and sustained action to address its security implications (Werz & Conley, 2012).

The mass movement of climate migrants has implications for public health, both for the migrant population and further afield. It is documented that current migrant and refugee populations suffer worse health outcomes than settled populations (Brown, 2008). For example, migrating populations may be exposed to infectious diseases for which they have limited immunity or face new climate-related health risks in the destination context. Population displacement undermines the provision of medical care and vaccination programmes; making infectious diseases harder to deal with and more deadly. Equally, refugees may also migrate from sites of food insecurity or have improved access to health services in destination sites (Schwerdtle, et al., 2018).

It is suggested that climate migrants could lead to disease outbreaks, either by transporting disease into a region or because migrants are not immunised against already established diseases. In Brazil, for example, periodic epidemic waves of visceral leishmaniasis - a widespread parasitic disease with a global incidence of 500,000 new human cases each year - have been associated with migrations to urban areas after long periods of drought (Franke, et al., 2002). It is also suggested that the migration of a population not immunised against a specific disease, e.g. measles, into a country where immunisation is high but not complete could cause outbreaks of disease - and therefore additional infectious disease deaths - which would not have occurred due to herd immunity in the receiving population. However, overall there is limited evidence for significant impact on the health of Western citizens by migrants and refugees and it is argued that the debate about climate, migration and health should focus instead on the wellbeing of refugees and migrants (Randall, 2015).

Climate-related conflict could also prevent a focus on the actions required to prevent or mitigate against climate change. Although little research has focused on this issue, it is possible that increasing conflict could result in climate mitigation efforts being less effective and the mortality impacts of climate change accelerating. However, this second-order effect is probably not large and less important than the fact that climate change is driving potential conflict.

Consideration of volatility in individual years rather than long-term trends

This project has considered trends in climate drivers, however there is evidence that the volatility of some climate drivers will also change over the 21st century. There will likely be increased incidence of extreme dryness or wetness, more persistent periods of abnormally warm or cold weather, increased frequency of extreme rainfall events and more concentrated periods of severe weather (IPCC, 2013).

To explore the potential impacts of climate volatility on liabilities, a single year of extreme temperature has been modelled. In the first volatility scenario (V1) it is assumed that the percentage of the year with days >21°C in 2040 doubles from around 3% to 6% (the equivalent of approximately 22 days per year). In the second volatility scenario (V1) it is assumed that the percentage of the year with days >21°C in 2040 triples from around 3% to 9% (the equivalent of approximately 32 days per year).

Results are presented in Figure 4 which shows the improvement stress for a 50-year-old between 2018 and 2078. Under the RCP 8.5 scenario the improvement stress in 2040 is -0.018% (grey line), whereas when the percentage of the year with days >21°C is doubled (V1 scenario) the improvement stress increases to -0.24%. Similarly, tripling the percentage of the year with days >21°C results in an improvement stress of -0.45%. As shown at the beginning of this section, the largest impact is seen for younger ages.

graph showing proportional change in expectation of life relative to the base scenario for two volatility scenarios and combined climate drivers
Figure 4. Change in annual mortality improvements relative to the base scenario for two volatility scenarios and combined climate drivers

Next time

The fifth and final chapter explores the implications of our work for life insurers and pension schemes. We identify areas for future research and consider the potential role of the actuarial community.

Upcoming chapters

  • Implications for life insurers and pension schemes

Footnotes:

Baylis, M., 2017. Potential impact of climate change on emerging vectorborne and other infections in the UK.. Environmental Health, 16(112).
Brown, O., 2008. Migration and Climate Change, s.l.: International Organization for Migration.
Cull, B. et al., 2018. Surveillance of British ticks: An overview of species records, host associations, and new records of Ixodes ricinus distribution.. Ticks and tick-borne diseases, 9(3), pp. 605-614.
Franke, C., Ziller, M., Staubach, C. & Latif, M., 2002. Impact of the El Niño Oscillation. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 8(9), pp. 914-917.
FSB, 2017. Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, Basel, Switzerland: Financial Stability Board.
Hajat, S., Kovats, R. & Lachowycz, K., 2007. Heat-related and cold-related deaths in England and Wales: who is at risk?. Occupational and environmental medicine, 64(2), pp. 93-100.
Hsiang, S. M., 2016. Climate Econometrics. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 8(1).
Hunt, A., Watkiss, P. & Horrocks, L., 2009. International Impacts of Climate Change on the UK, London: Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
IPCC, 2013. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kahn, M. et al., 2019. Long-Term Macroeconomic Effects of Climate Change: A Cross-Country Analysis, s.l.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Knox, J., Morris, J. & Hess, T., 2012. Identifying future risks to UK agricultural crop production: Putting climate change in context. Outlook on Agriculture, 39(4), pp. 249-256.
Kompas, T., Pham, V. H. & Che, T. N., 2018. The Effects of Climate Change on GDP by Country and the Global Economic Gains From Complying With the Paris Climate Accord. Earth's Future, 6(8).
Lindsay, S. et al., 2010. Assessing the future threat from vivax malaria in the United Kingdom using two markedly different modelling approaches. Malaria journal, 9(1), pp. 1-8.
Medlock, J. et al., 2013. Driving forces for changes in geographical distribution of Ixodes ricinus ticks in Europe.. Parasites & vectors, 6(1).
Medlock, J. & Leach, S., 2015. Effect of climate change on vector-borne disease risk in the UK.. The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 15(6), pp. 721-730.
Metelmann, S. et al., 2019. The UK’s suitability for Aedes albopictus in current and future climates.. Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 16(152).
Morison, J. & Matthews, R., 2016. Agriculture and Forestry Climate Change Impacts Summary Report, s.l.: Living With Environmental Change.
Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology, 2019. POSTNOTE 597: Climate Change and Vector-Borne Diseases in Humans in the UK, London: Houses of Parliament.
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2019. Climate Change and Vector-Borne Diseases in Humans in the UK, London: Houses of Parliament.
Randall, A., 2015. Climate, migration and health – connections and challenges. Climate and MigrationCoalition.
Daniels, M., Dominici, F., Samet, J. & Zeger, S., 2000. Estimating particulate matter-mortality dose-response curves and threshold levels: an analysis of daily time-series for the 20 largest US cities.
Schwartz & Marcus, 1990.  
Schwerdtle, P., Bowen, K. & McMichael, C., 2018. The health impacts of climate-related migration. BMC medicine, 16(1), pp. 1-7.
Stern, N., 2007. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Werz, M. & Conley, L., 2012. Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict, s.l.: Centre for American Progress.
WHO, 2015. Malaria mortality rate, s.l.: World Health Organisation. World Health Organisation, 2018. Climate change and health. [Online] Available at: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health#:~:text=Climate%20change%20affects%20the%20social,malaria%2C%20diarrhoea%20and%20heat%20stress. [Accessed 27 October 2020].

Authors

Keziah Baskerville-Muscutt
Risk Associate, Insurance Consulting and Technology

Keziah Baskerville-Muscutt is a Risk Associate in Willis Towers Watson’s Insurance Consulting and Technology business and graduated from Durham University with a degree in Physical Geography and MSc in Risk (Climate & Environmental).


Director

Richard Marshall is a Director in Willis Towers Watson’s Insurance Consulting and Technology business and leads the development of mortality and demographic risk models for our UK business.


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